Terrorism is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that can generally be defined as the systematic use or threat of violence(typically against civilians or symbolic targets) with the aim of instilling fear, advancing an ideology, asserting a political stance, or effecting changes in the policies of a government or society. Despite the broad range of potential targets, terrorists operate under resource constraints. This paper employs a game-theoretic model to examine the optimal allocation of budgets between a defender (the government) and an attacker (the terrorist) across multiple targets. The model demonstrates that the equilibrium investment of both parties depends on budget constraints, target values, and the effectiveness of their expenditures. The findings indicate that both attacker and defender increase their investments as the perceived value of a target rises from their own perspective. Conversely, the attacker’s investment is negatively correlated with the target’s value from the defender’s viewpoint, as higher defensive investment reduces the likelihood of a successful attack. In contrast, the defender’s investment is positively correlated with the target’s value from the attacker’s perspective, as it signifies a heightened threat. Moreover, if the defender assumes the attack will focus solely on a single target, they may incur greater losses. Budget analysis reveals that as the defender’s budget increases, the probability of an attack on their most valuable target decreases, while an increase in the attacker’s budget leads to a more dispersed focus, reducing emphasis on the highest-value target. These results offer insights for more effective policy making in the allocation of defensive resources