A Three-level Game Theory Model for Modeling the Defender and Attackers Considering the Deception Strategy Between Them

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Command University and Aja Headquarters, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Security is the most basic need of any society that affects different parts of it. Also, due to increasing security threats and limited resources to deal with them, it is necessary for security resources to be deployed in an optimal state. Furthermore, because of resources limitation, the use of deceptive resources is used by the attacker and the defender. Game theory is a common way to understand the concepts, strategies and consequently the allocation of limited resources of the attacker and defender. In this paper, a three-level Stackelberg security game between a defender and two attackers is modeled in a situation where the defender and the attacker try to deceive each other. The advantage of this research compared to the previous papers is to model the attacker and defender deception as well as considering the financial limitations and limitations related to attack and defense in a three-level model. The utility of the defender and the attackers is modeled along with their limitations. The model is converted into a single-level model using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker method and solved, describing its application in defense decision-making. The obtained results show that by using the proposed model, limited security resources are optimally allocated, which leads to the improvement of security conditions and dealing optimally with security threats.

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References

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Journal of Advanced Defense Science & Technology
Volume 14, Issue 2 - Serial Number 52
summer 2024
September 2024
Pages 89-99

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History

  • Receive Date: 20 May 2023
  • Revise Date: 13 July 2023
  • Accept Date: 29 July 2023
  • Publish Date: 08 September 2023

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